Abstract-We study the physical-layer security of a cognitive radio system in the face of multiple eavesdroppers (EDs), which is composed of a secondary base station (SBS), multiple secondary users (SUs) as well as a pair of primary transmitter (PT) and primary receiver (PR), where the SUs first harvest energy from their received radio frequency signals transmitted by the PT and then communicate with the SBS relying on opportunistic scheduling. We consider two specific user scheduling schemes, namely, the channel-aware user scheduling (CaUS) and the energy-aware user scheduling (EaUS). In the CaUS scheme, an SU having the best instantaneous SU-SBS link (spanning from SUs to SBS) will be activated to communicate with the SBS. By contrast, the EaUS scheme takes into account both the amount of energy harvested from the PT and the instantaneous quality of the SU-SBS link. We analyze the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) of both the CaUS and EaUS schemes in terms of their intercept versus outage probability. We also provide the SRT analysis of traditional round-robin user scheduling (RrUS) used as a benchmarker of the CaUS and EaUS schemes. We demonstrate that the EaUS scheme achieves the best outage and secrecy performance in the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) region, but a worse secrecy performance than the CaUS method in the low-MER region. Moreover, from a security versus reliability perspective, the CaUS outperforms both the EaUS and the RrUS in the low-MER region. Surprisingly, this also implies that although the user scheduling criterion of EaUS exploits the knowledge of both the amount of harvested power and instantaneous channel state information (CSI), it exhibits a degraded physical-layer security in the low-MER region due to the fact that the increased harvested energy is beneficial not only for the legitimate SBS receiver but also for the EDs.
I. INTRODUCTION

E
NERGY harvesting is capable of extracting energy from the surrounding environment, which is emerging as an efficient technique of supplying energy and has been beneficially integrated into cognitive radio (CR) systems [1] , [2] for extending the life-time of energy-constrained networks, whilst reducing their deployment cost. There are two widely adopted energy harvesting architectures, namely power splitting (PS) and time switching (TS) [3] , [4] . In a PS architecture, the received signal power can be split into two parts, where a certain fraction is used for harvesting energy, while the rest is used for processing the received signal. By contrast, in a TS architecture, the transmission slot is divided into two phases. In the first phase, the system harvests energy from the surrounding environment and the harvested energy is used for transmitting the signal in the second phase. In CR networks, the SUs are vulnerable to both internal as well as to external attacks [5] . Furthermore, due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the confidential messages transmitted in the CR networks may become overheard by malicious EDs. Hence, apart from maintaining the reliability of transmission, we have to protect the CR networks against malicious eavesdropping.
Physical-layer security (PLS) [6] , [7] has received increasing research attention as a benefit of its ability of exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels to guard against wiretapping. In [8] and [9] , multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) schemes were invoked for the sake of enhancing the instantaneous secrecy rate. Beamforming techniques [10] , [11] were also developed for wireless secrecy improvement. Additionally, jamming schemes [12] , [13] were conceived for 0090-6778 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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preventing wiretapping by the E at the expense of negligible interference imposed on the legitimate nodes, demonstrating that transmitting specifically designed artificial noise enhances the security of wireless communications. As a design alternative, both user scheduling schemes [14] , [15] as well as relay selection schemes [16] - [19] were advocated for upgrading the security of wireless communications. Specifically, cooperative jamming aided user scheduling schemes have been proposed in [14] and [15] , relying on a physical-layer security perspective. Poursajadi and Madani [16] and Deng et al. [17] conceived one-way relay selection schemes to assist the wireless transmissions of the source, demonstrating that the relay selection schemes are indeed capable of improving the secrecy of wireless transmissions. Moreover, two-way relay selection schemes have been proposed in [18] and [19] for physical-layer security improvement.
As a further development, PLS has also been designed for energy harvesting aided CR networks. In contrast to conventional CR networks, more efforts should be invested in enhancing the security vs reliability tradeoff of CR networks relying on both energy harvesting (EH) and PLS. The secrecy beamforming concept has been proposed in [20] for improving the physical-layer security of energy-harvesting-based CR networks. Moreover, sophisticated jamming schemes have been investigated in [21] and [22] . To be specific, in [21] , a novel wireless EH cooperative jammer-aided transmission scheme was conceived for enhancing the security for cooperative CR networks. In order to improve the security of the primary network, an artificial-noise-aided cooperative jamming scheme was provided in [22] for a multiple-input single-output CR network. Furthermore, in [23] , an optimal relay selection based two EH protocols has been proposed to achieve a better tradeoff between the security of primary transmission and the efficiency of secondary transmission. Lei et al. [24] investigated an underlay MIMO CR network consisting of a pair of primary nodes, a couple of secondary nodes as well as an E, and the secrecy outage performance of the proposed the optimal antenna selection and suboptimal antenna selection schemes have been analyzed.
Against this background, we explore the PLS of a energy harvesting oriented cognitive network comprised of multiple SUs in the presence of multiple EDs, where the SUs harvest energy from the primary transmitter at the beginning of the transmission slot. Then, in order to enhance the SRT performance, they will be chosen to communicate opportunistically with the SBS according to our user scheduling criterion. In contrast to [20] - [24] , in this paper, multiple users and multiple EDs are considered. Moreover, the EDs are allowed to act cooperatively, and they are equipped with multiple antennas. Additionally, the transmit power of a SU is constrained to the minimum value between the harvested energy and the maximum tolerable interference imposed on the primary receiver. Furthermore, this paper focuses on striking a tradeoff between the security and the reliability. Explicitly, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
Firstly, we present a pair of beneficial user scheduling schemes. The first one is termed as the channel-aware user scheduling (CaUS), while the second one is referred to as energy-aware user scheduling (EaUS). To be specific, in the CaUS scheme, the particular user having the maximal channel gain of the SU-SBS link will be selected as the cooperative transmission user. By contrast, the specific user having the maximal achievable rate will transmit in a given time slot of the EaUS scheme, which relies both on the channel state information (CSI) of the main links (spanning from the SUs to the SBS) and on the amount of harvested energy.
Secondly, we analyze both the outage probability (OP) and intercept probability (IP) of the CaUS and EaUS schemes for transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. We also evaluate the OP and IP of the traditional round-robin user scheduling (RrUS) scheme for comparison. Moreover, we will show that the EaUS scheme outperforms the RrUS and EaUS schemes in terms of its OP, whereas the CaUS scheme achieves a better IP than that of the EaUS scheme, indicating a tradeoff between the IP and the OP of the CaUS and EaUS schemes. It is plausible that scheduling SUs based on the amount of harvested energy in the EaUS scheme may be capable of enhancing the reliability of the wireless transmission of the SUs-SBS links, but this is also beneficial for the wiretap links (spanning from the SUs to EDs), especially if a legitimate user is activated when it has a low channel gain for the main link and simultaneously a high harvested energy.
Finally, we evaluate the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) of both the RrUS as well as of the CaUS and EaUS schemes, demonstrating that the CaUS scheme performs better than the EaUS scheme in terms of its SRT in the low-MER region, and the EaUS achieves the best SRT among the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes in the high-MER region. To be specific, in the low-MER region the CaUS scheme achieves a lower OP than that of the EaUS scheme at a given IP constraint. Moreover, the CaUS scheme becomes more suitable for guarding against eavesdropping attacks in the face of more EDs upon increasing the number of the SUs of a given OP constraint in the low-MER region. By contrast, the EaUS scheme is more suitable for guaranteeing the security of wireless transmissions in the high-MER region.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we briefly characterize the PLS of an EH aided cognitive radio (CR) network. In Section III, we carry out the SRT analyses of the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes communicating over a Rayleigh channel. Our performance evaluations are detailed in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we conclude the paper.
II. USER SCHEDULING FOR ENERGY-HARVESTING COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider an underlay cognitive radio network consisting of a secondary network coexisting with a primary network, where the secondary network harvests energy from the primary network. The primary network supports a primary transmitter (PT) and primary receiver (PR) pair. In the secondary network, there are N SUs, denoted by SU i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, communicating with a secondary base station (SBS) in the presence of M eavesdroppers (EDs), denoted by E k , k ∈ {1, . . . , M}, where the EDs want to overhear the messages transmitted by the SUs. The EDs are equipped with multiple antennas. We assume that all the EDs have the same number of antennas, which is denoted by N E . The SBS is also equipped with N B receiving antennas, while each SU only has a single antenna. All links are modeled by Rayleigh fading [26] , where the dashed lines and green lines in Fig. 1 represent the wiretap links (spanning from the SUs to the EDs) and energy harvesting links (spanning from the PT to the SUs), respectively. Let
which experience Rayleigh fading with respective variances of
the jth antenna of the SBS and lth antenna of E k , respectively. Moreover, following [4] , [22] , [28] , and [38] , the interference received at the SBS from the PT can be considered to be a complex Gaussian random variable under the assumption that the primary signal may be generated by a random Gaussian codebook. Although the amplitude of the Gaussian codebook varies as a function of time, the secondary users can still harvest sufficient energy from the primary transmitter, provided that the energy harvesting time is much longer than the period of the Gaussian codebook. Moreover, the thermal noise at the SBS and E is also complex Gaussian distributed. Thus, the interference plus noise at the SBS and E can be modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance N 0 . Moreover, for notational convenience, let U and E represent the set of N SUs and M EDs, respectively. Following [22] , [38] , and [39] , we also assume that only a single SU is activated to perform its transmissions in order to reduce the multiple-access interference imposed on the PR.
We also assume that the (SU i -SBS) pair can complete its data transmission within two phases, denoted by αT and (1 − α)T , where α represents the portion occupied by the energy harvesting phase, T denotes the transmit slot duration, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Specifically, all user nodes harvest energy from the radio frequency (RF) signals transmitted by PT in the first phase of duration αT . In the second phase (1 − α)T , the selected user node will transmit the data to its corresponding destination node. It is worth pointing out that if the SUs harvest energy from the SBS, the SBS has to transmit at sufficiently high power to guarantee the required level of energy harvested at the SUs, which may inflict harmful interference upon the primary receiver. Although power control can be used for reducing the interference, this will not only increase the system's complexity, but also limits the amount of energy harvested by the SUs. By contrast, in the spirit of [4] and [37] , we assume that the SUs harvest as much energy as possible from the primary transmitter. Moreover, following [4] , the energy harvested in the first phase of user node SU i can be expressed as
where η represents the energy conversion efficiency of the EH nodes, and 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, P T denotes the transmit power of the PT. It is pointed out that although the non-linear energy harvesting (EH) model conceived in [31] is more practical, it is analytically untractable [32] . Moreover, the non-linear model exhibits piecewise linearity, especially in the relatively low-power and high-power regimes, whilst the users relying entirely on EH may operate in the low-power regime, due to the limited efficiency of EH over wireless channels. Hence, the non-linear EH model of [31] can be roughly approximated by a linear energy harvesting model at relatively low powers, which has been widely adopted in the existing literature [4] and [33] - [36] .
In this subsection, we assume that SU i is selected to transmit its data to the SBS in the transmission slot. Thus, the instantaneous achievable rate of the (SU i -SBS) link can be expressed as
where P i denotes the transmit power of SU i , which depends both on the amount of energy harvested at the SU i and on the interference temperature P I experienced at the PR and expressed as
Meanwhile, the signal transmitted by SU i will be overheard by E, due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Similarly to (2), the instantaneous achievable rate of the (SU i -E k ) link can be written as
In this paper, we assume that the EDs intercept the transmission between the SUs and SBS cooperatively with the aid of maximal ratio combining (MRC). As a result, the instantaneous achievable rate of the wiretap channel can be expressed as
B. User Scheduling Relying on Channel State Information
Scheduling criterion: This subsection details the channelaware user scheduling (CaUS) scheme, where the user having the best link to the SBS will be chosen to transmit. Thus, the user scheduling criterion of the CaUS scheme can be expressed as:
where u represents the index of the selected user. Explicitly this scheduling only relies on the instantaneous CSI, without on the transmit power of the chosen user.
C. Joint Energy Harvesting and Channel State Information Based User Scheduling
Scheduling criterion: In this section, we present the energyaware user scheduling (EaUS) scheme, wherein a user having the maximal instantaneous achievable rate C UiB will be selected to transmit its signal in the given time slot, which is formulated as
where o denotes the index of the selected user.
Constraints: The transmit power P i is constrained by:
Substituting (7b) into (7a) yields:
Observe from (8) that the user scheduling criterion relies not only on the CSIs of the link spanning from the SU i to the SBS, but also on the amount of energy harvested and on the maximum tolerable interference imposed on the PR.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we present our SRT analysis both for the CaUS as well as for the EaUS schemes for transmission over Rayleigh channels. For comparison, we also provide the SRT analysis of the traditional RrUS scheme. Based on [26] , the SRT is quantified in terms of the IP and OP, respectively.
A. Conventional Round-Robin User Scheduling
As a benchmarking scheme, this subsection provides the IP and OP analyses of the traditional RrUS scheme. In the spirit of [25] - [27] , the OP of the RrUS scheme can be defined as
where b denotes the index of the chosen user, and R o represents the overall data rate of (SU b -SBS) transmission. More specifically, following the literature [26] , [27] , a secrecy encoder encodes the source messages for transmission at a secrecy rate of R s , which will generate extra redundancy for improving the PLS of wireless transmissions. In the conventional RrUS scheme, each SU in the set will be chosen to transmit with an equal probability. Therefore, using the law of total probability [28] , we can obtain the OP for the RrUS scheme as
As mentioned above, in the RrUS scheme, each SU has the same probability to be activated as the transmission node, and substituting (2) and (3) into (10) yields:
where
ηαPT . Then (11) can be reformulated as
where I 0 and I 1 are given by
and
respectively. According to Appendix A, I 0 can be obtained as (15) at the top of the next page. Moreover, I 1 can be formulated as
Substituting (15) and (16) into (12), P RrUS out can be obtained. Based on [26] , an intercept event occurs when the instantaneous achievable rate of the eavesdropper's channel becomes (15) higher than R 0 − R s . Therefore, the definition of the RrUS scheme's IP can be formulated as
where R e denotes the difference between R o as well as R s , and we have R e = R o − R s . Using the law of total probability [28] , the IP of the RrUS scheme can be rewritten as
Similarly to (12) , by combining (3) and (5), we arrive at
where I 2 and I 3 can be formulated as
respectively, where Δ 3 = (2
Re
(1−α)T − 1)N 0 . Based on Appendix B, I 2 can be expressed as (22) at the top of the next page, and I 3 can be given by
Therefore, substituting (22) and (23) into (19) , P RrUS int can be obtained.
B. Channel-Aware User Scheduling
This subsection presents the SRT analysis of the channelaware user scheduling (CaUS) scheme. In the CaUS scheme, similarly to (9), the OP of the CaUS scheme can be expressed as
Using the law of total probability [28] , and substituting both (2) and (6) into (24), yields
Combining (3) and (25), we arrive at
where T 0 and T 1 can be expressed as
respectively. Based on Appendix C, T 1 and T 0 can be formulated as (29) and (30) at the top of the next page, respectively. Then, using (29) and (30) , P CaUS out can be obtained. Similarly to (17) , we can express the IP of the CaUS scheme as
Combining (5) and (6), and relying on the law of total probability [28] , (31) can be rewritten as
Similarly to (26) , substituting (3) into (32), we arrive at
where T 2 and T 3 can be expressed as:
respectively. Based on Appendix E, T 2 and T 3 can be formulated as
respectively. Substituting (36) and (37) into (33), P CaUS int can be obtained.
C. Energy-Aware User Scheduling
In this subsection, we analyze the SRT of the proposed energy-aware user scheduling (EaUS) scheme. According to the definition in (9), the OP of the EaUS scheme can be formulated as:
Substituting (2) and (7) into (38) yields
Substituting (3) into (39), we arrive at
Substituting (15) and (16) into (40), finally we obtain P EaUS out . Upon relying on the definition of the IP defined in (17) , the IP of the proposed EaUS scheme can be expressed as
Using (5), (7) and the law of total probability [28] , (41) can be expressed as
Upon substituting (3) into (42), we arrive at (43) at the top of the next page. However, it is challenging to obtain the closedform expression of Q 1_0 (x), Q 1_1 (x), Q 3_0 (y) and Q 3_1 (y) of Appendix D. For simplicity, in the spirit of [24] and [29] , it is shown that performing the optimal user selection for the SBS can be viewed as being equivalent to the random user selection
for the EDs. We assume that
. As a result, (41) can be rewritten as
After further manipulations, (44) can be given by
It is worth pointing out that it can be observed from (12), (26) and (40) that our SU scheduling schemes are designed for reducing the outage probability (OP) of wireless transmissions, and that the OP of the schemes conceived can be further reduced as the number of SUs increases. By contrast, increasing the number of SUs does not reduce the OP of the RRUS scheme. Moreover, observe from (19) , (33) and (45) that the intercept probability (IP) of all schemes is equal, which means that the schemes advocated are unable to directly reduce the IP of wireless transmissions. However, according to our SRT analysis, the security of wireless transmissions can still be improved, since the reliability enhancement attained can be converted into a secrecy improvement. Moreover, the amount of energy harvested and used for the secondary transmission is beneficial both for the legitimate reception at the SBS as well as for the EDs. To be specific, in the high-MER region, the EaUS scheme outperforms the CaUS scheme in terms of its SRT, since the main channel gain is much higher than that of the wiretapping channel in the high-MER region. Hence, increasing the transmit power for the secondary transmission is more beneficial for the legitimate reception at the SBS. By contrast, in the low-MER region, the CaUS is capable of achieving a better SRT than that of the EaUS scheme. The CaUS scheme can still be used for protecting wireless transmissions by increasing the number of SUs even at very low MER. Generally speaking, the CaUS and EaUS schemes conceived are capable of flexible reconfiguration according to the different MER regions.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our performance comparisons of the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes in terms of their IP and OP. Specifically, the analytic OP of the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes were evaluated by plotting (12), (26) and (40) , respectively. Moreover, the IP of the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes were obtained by using (19) , (33) and (41), respectively. The lower bound IP of the EaUS scheme is provided by (46). The simulated IP and OP of the RrUS as well as of the CaUS and the EaUS schemes are provided for demonstrating the correctness of the theoretical results. In our numerical evaluations, we assume that Fig. 2 that as the number of the SUs increases from N = 2 to 8, all the OP of the CaUS and of the EaUS schemes is significantly reduced, which shows that increasing the number of the SUs is beneficial for the reliability of both the CaUS and of the EaUS schemes. Furthermore, Fig. 2 also shows that increasing the number of the SUs increases the IP of the EaUS scheme. Due to the fact that the user scheduling criterion of the EaUS scheme considers the product of the channel gains (spanning from the SUs to the SBS) and of the amount harvested energy, this indeed enhances the reliability of the SUs-SBS links, but simultaneously also increases the risk of the signals transmitted by a user being successfully intercepted. This is particularly likely to occur if the user has a low channel gain for the SU-SBS link, but a high harvested energy. Additionally, the EaUS scheme outperforms the CaUS and RrUS schemes in terms of its OP. However, the CaUS scheme achieves a lower IP than that of the EaUS scheme, showing a tradeoff between the security and reliability. Additionally, the black lines plotted in Fig. 2 can be used to assist us in verifying the analysis, where the amount of the harvested energy is not considered in the IP analysis of the EaUS scheme, which quantifies the lower bound of the IP of the EaUS. In order to take a more objective view of the CaUS and EaUS schemes, we analyze their SRT. In contrast to the CaUS and EaUS schemes, the users supported by the RrUS scheme take turns in communicating with the SBS. Hence, the IP and OP of the RrUS scheme remains unchanged, when the number of SUs increases from N = 2 to 8. Fig. 3 that as the number of SUs increases from N = 2 to 8, the SRT of the CaUS, of the EaUS and of OUS schemes is increased, showing that increasing the number of the SUs improves the SRT of the CaUS, EaUS and OUS schemes. We observe from Fig. 3 that the CaUS scheme outperforms the EaUS and RrUS scheme in terms of its SRT. This implies that the CaUS benefits more from the SUs-SBS cooperation in terms of enhancing the SRT of the networks investigated. However, the SRT of the RrUS scheme remains unchanged, when the number of SUs increases from N = 2 to 8. This is because the SU-SBS link of the RrUS scheme is selected randomly, without cooperation between the SUs. Additionally, although the OUS scheme achieves the best SRT performance, this result is obtained at the cost of degrading the OP, whilst additionally relying not only on the instantaneous CSIs of the main links, but also on the instantaneous CSIs of the wiretap links. However, the CaUS and EaUS schemes do not require the instantaneous CSIs of the wiretap links, which are usually unavailable in practical systems.
In Fig. 4 , we show the IP vs OP of the conventional RrUS as well as of the CaUS and EaUS schemes for different α values. Observe from Fig. 4 that the IP of the RrUS, the CaUS and of the EaUS schemes vary as α changes from α = 0.8 to 0.3. Thus, Fig. 4 demonstrates that varying the factor α improves the SRT of wireless transmissions in the EH-aided CR networks investigated. Additionally, Fig. 4 also demonstrates that the CaUS scheme attains the best SRT among the RrUS as well as the CaUS and EaUS schemes, as α varies from 0.8 to 0.3. Fig. 5 illustrates the IP vs OP of the conventional RrUS as well as of the CaUS and EaUS schemes for different MER, where MER= λ m /λ e . Observe in Fig. 5 that increasing MER improves the SRT of the CaUS and EaUS schemes. In both MER = −3dB and MER = 5dB cases, the SRT of the CaUS scheme is best among the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes. Furthermore, it can also be seen from Fig. 5 that the CaUS scheme can achieve a lower IP than the EaUS and RrUS schemes at a specific OP. In contrast to the EaUS scheme, this means that the SRT benefits from cooperation amongst the SUs by protecting against eavesdropping with the CaUS scheme in the low-MER region. By contrast, in MER = 15dB case, EaUS scheme outperforms the CaUS and RrUS schemes in terms its SRT, showing EaUS is more suitable for guarding wireless transmissions in the high-MER region.
In Fig. 6 , we present the IP vs OP of the conventional RrUS as well as of the CaUS and EaUS schemes for different number of the EDs M . Observe from Fig. 6 that the SRT of the RrUS, the CaUS and EaUS schemes degrades as M varies from M = 2 to 8. Additionally, Fig. 6 also demonstrates that the CaUS scheme outperforms the RrUS and EaUS schemes in terms of its SRT. At a given OP constraint, although increasing the number of EDs naturally increases the risk of eavesdropping attacks, the CaUS scheme can be used to guard against the eavesdropping attacks by increasing the number of SUs, where OP constraint is a certain threshold of outage probability of wireless transmissions. Fig. 7 shows the secrecy rate vs SNR of the conventional RrUS as well as of the CaUS and EaUS schemes. Observe from Fig. 7 that upon increasing the SNR, the secrecy rate of all schemes improves correspondingly, whereas the secrecy rate of all schemes remain at a steady state subsequently. Moreover, it can also be seen from Fig. 7 that the CaUS scheme outperforms the RrUS and EaUS schemes in terms of its secrecy rate, demonstrating its superiority. Fig. 8 explores the IP vs OP of the conventional RrUS and PwRrUS as well as the CaUS, PwCaUS, EaUS, and PwEaUS schemes for different γ th , where γ th represents the ratio of the saturation threshold and N 0 of the piece-wise linear EH model [32] . It can be seen from Fig. 8 that upon varying the value of γ th , the IP vs OP of the PwRrUS, PwCaUS, and PwEaUS schemes will be adjusted simultaneously. Moreover, observe from Fig. 8 that the IP vs OP relationships of the PwCaUS and PwEaUS schemes are approximately equivalent to that of the CaUS and EaUS schemes at γ th = 10dB. By contrast, the IP vs OP relationships of the PwRrUS scheme are similar to that of the RrUS scheme, when γ th is above 8dB, because the SUs of the RrUS scheme are randomly selected.
In Fig. 9 , we investigate the IP and OP vs SNR ( PT N0 ) of the conventional RrUS and BRrUS as well as the CaUS, BCaUS, EaUS, and BEaUS schemes. It is worth mentioning that in the battery aided schemes each SU can harvest energy not only from the PT, but also from the transmitting SU, and the remaining energy of the transmitting SU and other SUs will be stored in their own batteries [41] , which can be represented 
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2 ), P B is the maximum power stored in the battery, and P B /N 0 is assumed to be 15dB, h ij is the channel gain of the SU i -SU j link, i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N} and i = j. In this context we assumed that the links between the SUs are subjected to Rayleigh fading, all having the same variance of λ ss = 0.1. Observe from Fig. 9 that the battery aided schemes have no obvious beneficial effect on enhancing the SRT, due to that the OP of the battery aided schemes may be considerably decreased, whereas the IP of these schemes will be increased accordingly.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the PLS of a CR network consisting of a primary network and a secondary network in the presence of multiple EDs, where the nodes of the secondary network harvest energy from the transmitter of the primary network. We conceived the CaUS and EaUS schemes for improving the performance of the network investigated. To be specific, a user having the best link will be activated to transmit its signal to the SBS in the CaUS scheme. By contrast, a user having the maximal product of transmit power and channel gain will be selected as the transmitting user in the time-slot considered. The traditional RrUS scheme was used as our benchmarker. We derived the OP and IP expressions for the RrUS, CaUS and EaUS schemes. It was shown that the EaUS scheme outperforms the CaUS and RrUS schemes in terms of its OP. However, the CaUS scheme has the best SRT in the low-MER region. Additionally, the EaUS scheme has the worst IP of the three schemes. Finally, the security of wireless transmissions in the CaUS and EaUS schemes is upgraded upon increasing the number of SUs N .
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2 ) can be formulated as
respectively, where f V (v) and f W (w) are the PDFs of the random variables (RVs) V and W , respectively. Moreover, According to [30] , the CDF of U can be formulated as
Thus, (A.3) and (A.4) can be rewritten as
respectively. Based on [40] , I 0 and I 1 can be expressed as .6) and 
respectively, where F U (u) can be given by
Furthermore, (B.1) and (B.2) can be expanded as
respectively. Finally, I 2 and I 3 can be obtained as .6) and
and W = |h pi | 2 , T 0 and T 1 can be formulated as
respectively.
Substituting (A.3) into (C.1), T 0 can be expanded as
After further manipulations, T 0 can be expressed as
Similarly to (C.4), T 1 can be formulated as
where 
respectively, where
Based on (B.3), Q 0 (x) and Q 2 (y) can be obtained as
respectively, where a 0 (n) =
and Y are independent of each other, T 2 and T 3 can be rewritten as
and 
Using (E.3), (B.6) and (B.7), T 2 and T 3 can be obtained as
respectively. 
